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UNEQUAL PROTECTION: EXAMINING THE JUDICIARY’S 
TREATMENT OF UNWED FATHERS 
Brett Potash* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of the United States has heard a handful of 
cases dealing with constitutional questions relating to unmarried 
fathers and their rights concerning their children.1  Historically, unwed 
fathers have received overall negative treatment from courts around 
the country compared to their female counterparts.2  For example, until 
the 1970s, mothers (whether married or not) have always been able to 
consent to an adoption whereas unwed fathers could not.3  The 
differing treatment between mothers (married or not) and unwed 
fathers stems “from the difficulty of determining the identity of the 
natural father, compared with the ease of identifying the mother.”4  
This perception of “difficulty” affected the way courts have 
 
*B.A. in History, State University of New York College at Buffalo; J.D. 2018, Touro College 
Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.  I would like to give special thanks to my two Note Editors, 
Jessica Vogele and Rhona Amorado.  Their patience, support, feedback, and encouragement 
were crucial throughout the entire writing process.  This Note would not be what it is without 
either of them.  I would also like to thank Dean Myra Berman for her many discussions with 
me and suggestions about how I can make this the best Note possible.  Her expertise in this 
particular area of the law was highly valued and utilized throughout the entire Note.  I would 
also like to thank my loving family and friends who provided me unlimited support and 
motivation throughout my law school career.  Their understanding of the sacrifices I willingly 
took in order to simultaneously write this Note, while succeeding in law school, will forever 
be appreciated. 
1  Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); 
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley 
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
2 See generally Naomi R. Cahn, Family Issue(s), 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 325 (1994). 
3 Id. at 330. 
4 Id. 
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determined many notable cases, and in turn, have shaped the modern 
definition of a “family” as we know it today.5 
Traditionally speaking, the term “family” is typified by the 
nuclear, or “marital family” (i.e., married parents and their children).6  
Modernly speaking, there are practically an infinite number of 
combinations of people living together that can constitute a family.7  
Changes in patterns and forms of a “traditional” family have been the 
subject of intense public debate, and at the forefront of that debate is 
not only what constitutes a family but also to what individual 
constitutional rights parents may be entitled.8  The constitutional right 
to parent should be associated with the individual as opposed to the 
individual’s marital status because the definition of a “normal” 
marriage or family is constantly evolving.9   
The judiciary’s often negative opinion on the rights of unwed 
fathers can be attributed to the influence of societal gender 
stereotyping.10 Gender stereotypes are defined as 
“overgeneralization(s) of characteristics, differences, and attributes of 
a certain group based on their gender.”11  Many typical gender 
stereotypes remain prevalent in today’s film and television industry––
portraying women as “shy, passive, and submissive” and working 
“clean jobs” such as teaching or secretarial work, while portraying men 
as “tough, aggressive, dominant, and self-confident” and working 
“dirty” jobs such as construction or mechanics.12  These are broad 
generalizations that are not true for every individual; nevertheless, 
these stereotypes continue to exist despite evidence to the contrary.13   
 
5 See cases cited supra note 1. 
6 See generally David D. Meyer, Self-Definition in the Constitution of Faith and Family, 86 
MINN. L. REV. 791 (2002). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 792, 794. 
9 This, as mentioned, is more of an issue for unwed fathers as it is for mothers.  See generally 
Blythe Wygonik, Refocus on the Family: Exploring the Complications of granting the Family 
Immigration Benefit to Gay and Lesbian United States Citizens, 5 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 493 
(2005). 
10 Vicky C. Jackson, What Judges Can Learn From Gender Bias Task Force Studies, 
HEINONLINE (Sept. 21, 2017), 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/judica81&div=9&id=&page; 
Patricia R. Recupero et al., Gender Bias and Judicial Decisions of Undue Influence in 
Testamentary Challenges, JAAPL, (Sept. 21, 2017), http://jaapl.org/content/43/1/60. 
11 NOBULLYING, https://nobullying.com/gender-stereotypes/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2017). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
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Society expects individuals to behave in a manner consistent 
with his or her gender-specific stereotype and may harshly criticize 
those who do not.14  Society expects women to get married young and 
start having children as soon as practical.15  Men, because they are not 
the traditional homemakers or child-raising parents, are not normally 
faced with this kind of gender stereotyping.16  
Society has a preconceived notion that women are superior to 
men in raising children and make for better parents, and men, 
generally, are incapable of caring for and raising children on their 
own.17  During a custody battle, the mother will become the 
presumptive custodial parent, barring facts that suggest doing so would 
not be in the best interest of the child.18  Men, however, are as capable 
of raising children as woman are, absent facts suggesting otherwise.19  
Presumptively awarding women child custody over men, absent facts 
favoring this decision, may be grounds for an equal protection 
violation.20  When Courts deprive an unwed father of his rights, 
possibly due to a Justice’s personal bias, that Justice is legislating 
morality and abusing his or her power of judicial discretion; thereby 
violating the unwed father’s equal protection rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.21   
This Note argues that questions concerning the constitutional 
rights of not only unwed biological fathers but also parents in general, 
as it pertains to their children, should be subject to a strict scrutiny 
analysis and not intermediate scrutiny, which is the current standard.  
This Note will analyze and discuss the Court’s treatment of unwed 
fathers in the Stanley-Michael H. line of cases.  Each of these cases 
discuss the rights, or in some cases the lack thereof, of unwed fathers.22  
While the Court has yet to outline a specific definition for the term 
“parent,” this Note seeks to help form one.   
 
14 Bonnie L. Roach, Gender Stereotyping: The Evolution of Legal Protections for Gender 
Nonconformance, 12 ATLANTIC L.J. 125 (2010). 
15 See generally id. 
16 Id. 
17 NOBULLYING, supra note 12. 
18 See generally Bernardo Cuadra, Family Law- Maternal and Joint Custody Presumptions 
for Unmarried Parents, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 599 (2010). 
19 Id. 
20 See discussion infra Part II. 
21 See discussion infra Part I. 
22 See cases cited supra note 1. 
3
Potash: Unequal Protection
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
652 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
This Note will be divided into five parts.  Part II of this Note 
will analyze the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, along with its history 
and different levels of review.  Part III will provide an overview of five 
Supreme Court decisions in this area of law, commonly referred to as 
the Stanley-Michael H. line of cases.23  Part IV will analyze and discuss 
the similarities of the Stanley-Michael H. line of cases and distinguish 
these cases in terms of which favor the rights of unwed fathers and 
which hinders these rights.  Part V will suggest a solution to how the 
courts should treat unwed fathers as well as discuss how the Supreme 
Court, if ever presented the opportunity to define the term “parent,” 
should do so by incorporating unwed fathers into that definition.  Part 
VI will provide an overall summary of this Note’s most central theme: 
That the constitutional right to parent should be associated with the 
individual as opposed to the individual’s marital status. 
II.  THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides, “No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”24  The Supreme Court has stated, 
“The purpose of the equal protection clause . . . is to secure every 
person within the state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary 
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by 
its improper execution through duly constituted agents.”25  For almost 
a century, however, the Court was consistently reluctant to use the 
Equal Protection Clause to invalidate any state or local laws.26  During 
 
23 Because many of these cases have strong, persuasive dissents and do not have 
overwhelming majorities, this is an area of the law that will likely continue to be disputed. 
24 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  Equal protection applies to the federal government through 
judicial interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and to state and local 
governments through the Fourteenth Amendment.  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 712 (4th ed. 2011). The Supreme Court, 
however, has declared that “[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment is the same as 
that under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. 
25 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. 
v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923), (quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Twp. of 
Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918))). 
26 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 711 (4th ed. 
2011). 
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this time, the Court only decided race-related equal protection clause 
claims,27  as evident in the Slaughter-House Cases.28   
A.  History of the Equal Protection Clause 
In the 1872 Slaughter-House Cases, Louisiana created a partial 
monopoly concerning the slaughtering business by giving one 
company the sole privilege of slaughtering animals.29  Competing 
slaughterhouses, inter alia, argued that this violated their “equal 
protection of the laws.”30  The Court struck down their equal protection 
argument, opining that the claim was misplaced because the clause 
itself was established to void laws “clearly intended to prevent the 
hostile discrimination against the negro race.”31   
The Slaughter-House Cases represents an example that, prior 
to the Warren Court Era,32 the Court only applied the Equal Protection 
Clause to racial and ethnic minorities.33  In the mid-1950s, however, 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes referred to the Equal Protection Clause 
as “the last resort of constitutional arguments.”34  Justice Holmes was 
likely referring to the possibility that anyone may use the equal 
protection clause to challenge almost any law as discriminating against 
them.35  He also was likely referring to the Court’s consistent 
reluctance over the years to use the Equal Protection Clause to 
invalidate state or local laws.36  This reluctance, however, went awry 
in an infamous 1954 case concerning segregation in public schools.37 
In the seminal case, Brown v. Board of Education,38 the Court 
relied on the Equal Protection Clause as a key tool to overturn 
 
27 Id. 
28 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, (1872). 
29 Id. at 48. 
30 Id. at 66. 
31 Id. at 38. 
32 The Warren Court Era was between 1953-1959. See The Eisenhower Adiminstration, 
BOUNDLESS US HISTORY, https://www.boundless.com/u-s-history/textbooks/boundless-u-s-
history-textbook/politics-and-culture-of-abundance-1943-1960-28/the-eisenhower-
administration-216/the-warren-court-1460-8616/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2017). 
33 See Roger V. Abbott, Is Economic Protectionism a Legitimate Governmental Interest 
Under Rational Basis Review?, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 475, n.28 (2013). 
34 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
35 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26. 
36 Id. 
37 See generally Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
38 Id. 
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discriminatory laws and protect the citizens’ most fundamental 
rights.39  In Brown, the Court reviewed four state cases in which 
African-American children sought admission into their local public 
schools on a non-segregated basis.40  In each case, the children were 
denied admission to the schools attended by Caucasian children under 
state laws requiring or permitting segregation based on race.41  Since 
African-American children were treated differently from Caucasian 
children (in the educational setting) based solely on race, an Equal 
Protection violation was obvious.42   
The Court in Brown struck down state-sponsored segregation, 
the “separate but equal doctrine,” because of its stigmatizing effects43 
and because it denied some individuals educational opportunities.44  
The Brown Court felt that relying on the Equal Protection Clause in 
this instance was necessary because the separate but equal doctrine 
impinged on the paramount role that education plays “to our 
democratic society.”45  This case ushered in a new era of Equal 
Protection jurisprudence where the Equal Protection Clause would be 
used to combat invidious discrimination and for protecting 
fundamental rights.46   
B.  Equal Protection Clause Analysis  
In analyzing all Equal Protection cases, the first step is to ask 
whether a sufficient interest justifies the government’s classification.47  
To help answer this question, there are three distinct levels of judicial 
review—strict, intermediate, and rational basis—that the Supreme 
Court uses for different classifications in order to evaluate the 
constitutionality of a law, statute, or regulation.48  
 
39 Id. at 494. 
40 Id. at 487-88 
41 Id. 
42 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 493. 
46 Id. 
47 Downtown Bar & Grill, LLC v. State, 273 P.3d 709, 711 (Kan. 2012). 
48 See generally Melanie E. Meyers, Impermissible Purposes and the Equal Protection 
Clause, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1184 (1986). 
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1. Strict Scrutiny 
Strict scrutiny is “[s]trict in theory and fatal in fact”49 because 
the test is so difficult to overcome that a law under its review will 
almost certainly be invalidated.50  If a plaintiff can establish that strict 
scrutiny is the appropriate test for the Court to apply to the 
classification in question, the burden is on the state to show a 
compelling government purpose and that the means of achieving that 
compelling government purpose is narrowly tailored or there is no 
other less restrictive alternative.51   
Examples of classifications subject to strict scrutiny include 
race, alienage, national origin, religion, right to travel within the 
country, right of privacy, freedom of speech, right to vote, and 
infringements on fundamental rights, including the right to parent.52  
For racial classifications, the Court applies strict scrutiny to “smoke 
out illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is 
pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect 
tool.”53    
Strict scrutiny was applied in the famous case of Loving v. 
Virginia.54 In Loving, an interracial couple married in violation of a 
Virginia statute and were criminally convicted.55  On appeal to the 
Supreme Court, Virginia maintained that it had a compelling state 
interest to preserve racial pursuit through the anti-miscegenation 
statute.56  The Court disagreed and struck down the statute, reasoning 
that regulating marriage solely on the basis of race was arbitrary and 
invidious.57  The Court held that states might not prevent marriages 
between people solely on the basis of race without violating the Equal 
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.58  Therefore, the 
 
49 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A 
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
50 Id. 
51 See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005). 
52 Meyers, supra note 48, at n.14. 
53 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
54 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
55 The court agreed to set aside the verdict so long as the Lovings left Virginia and did not 
return for twenty-five years. Id. at 3.  
56 Id. at 8. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 12. 
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statute did not pass the strict scrutiny test because there was no 
compelling state interest.59  
2.  Intermediate Scrutiny 
Under intermediate scrutiny, the state has the burden to show 
that a law is substantially related to an important governmental 
purpose.60  As its name implies, intermediate scrutiny is a standard of 
review that is less rigorous than strict scrutiny, but more rigorous than 
rational basis.61  Classifications that are subject to intermediate 
scrutiny include discrimination against children born out of wedlock, 
commercial speech, speech in public forums, and gender 
discrimination.62  The Supreme Court first applied intermediate 
scrutiny in Craig v. Boren.63  
In Craig, the plaintiffs challenged a law which allowed women 
aged eighteen and over to purchase low alcohol content beer, but did 
not allow men to purchase any alcohol until they were twenty-one.64  
Oklahoma argued its important governmental purpose was to decrease 
the rate of drunk driving among teenage males.65  Statistical evidence 
was presented in an attempt to show the government had an important 
reason behind the enacted statute.66  The Court, however, stated that 
the statistical evidence was not substantially related enough to warrant 
the conclusion that gender represents an accurate marker for the 
regulation of drinking and driving.67  The Court held that this evidence 
was insufficient to support the gender-based discrimination that arose 
from the statute.68  
The statute did not pass intermediate scrutiny because the 
state’s method of achieving its objective (by banning men from 
purchasing alcohol until age twenty-one and allowing women to 
purchase low alcohol beer at age eighteen) was not substantially 
related to its purpose (to decrease the rate of drunk driving among 
 
59 Loving, 388 U.S. at 1. 
60 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266. 
61 See generally Meyers, supra note 48. 
62 Id. 
63 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
64 Id. at 191-92. 
65 Id. at 201. 
66 Id. at 201. 
67 Id. 
68 Craig, 429 U.S. at 201. 
8
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teenage males).  Therefore, the Court held that the gender-based 
discriminatory Oklahoma law violated equal protection.69   
3. Rational Basis 
Under rational basis scrutiny, the plaintiff has the burden to 
show that a law is rationally related to a legitimate government 
purpose.70  This standard of review applies to all state classifications 
that do not affect a suspect or a quasi-suspect class and do not impinge 
a fundamental right.71  Examples of classifications that, if challenged, 
would be subject to a mere rational basis review include, but are not 
limited to, economic relations, age discrimination, wealth 
discrimination, disability discrimination, and sexual orientation 
discrimination.72   
Historically, most legislation reviewed under rational basis is 
upheld because courts almost always defer to state governments for 
non-suspect classifications.73  The Supreme Court has held that, if a 
court can imagine any conceivable way in which a law or action 
furthers a legitimate purpose, a law subject to the rational basis test 
will be upheld.74  However, if a state’s interest in a particular piece of 
legislation is animus—the prejudicial disposition toward a discernible, 
constitutionally protected group of persons75— then the interest is not 
legitimate and the court will strike down the law.76   
In Romer v. Evans,77 Colorado voters adopted “Amendment 2” 
to their State Constitution prohibiting any judicial, legislative, or 
executive action designed to protect persons from discrimination based 
on their homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices 
 
69 Id. at 190-91. 
70 See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988); U.S. Railroad Retirement 
Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175, 177 (1980); Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 
527 (1959). 
71 See generally Meyers, supra note 48. 
72 Id. 
73 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955). 
74 FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993). 
75 Animus, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
76 See generally Meyers, supra note 48. 
77 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 
473 U.S. 432 (1985) Here, the court used rational basis to strike down a zoning ordinance that 
required special use permits for group homes for the mentally retarded.  Id. at 640.  The 
requirement appeared to rest solely on an irrational bias towards mentally retarded people. Id. 
9
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or relationships.78  Following a legal challenge by homosexual and 
other aggrieved parties, the state trial court entered a permanent 
injunction enjoining Amendment 2’s enforcement.79  The Colorado 
Supreme Court affirmed on appeal.80  The Supreme Court struck down 
Amendment 2, and held that the Amendment violated the equal 
protection clause because it singled out homosexuals and imposed on 
them a “broad disability” by denying them the right to seek and receive 
specific legal protection from discrimination.81  Even though most 
legislation reviewed under rational basis is upheld because of the 
deference is given to state legislatures for non-suspect classes, the 
Court held that the amendment was unexplainable “by anything but 
animus toward the class it affects.”82  As such, the Court invalidated 
the amendment because animus is not a legitimate governmental 
purpose.83  
To summarize, the Court uses strict scrutiny for “suspect” 
classifications based on race, national origin, and alienage,84 
intermediate scrutiny for “quasi-suspect” classifications based on 
gender and legitimacy,85 and rational basis for classifications based on 
age, wealth, disability, sexual orientation, and economic regulations.86   
The Court uses intermediate scrutiny for gender-based 
classifications because, in its opinion, differences between men and 
women may, in some circumstances, justify different treatment.87  
While recognizing that each case is fact specific and should be decided 
as such, using intermediate scrutiny as the presumptive standard for 
applying gender-based classifications is, in many of the following 
cases, too lenient of an approach.88  The parent-child relationship is 
such an important and sacred relationship that when an unwed father’s 
rights are literally on the line, he should be afforded the utmost 
 
78 Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-634. 
79 Id. at 625. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 620-621. 
82 Id. at 632. 
83 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
84 Suspect Classification, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
85 Id. 
86 Meyers, supra note 48. 
87 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996) (discussing the 
allowable bases for gender classifications). 
88 See Norman T. Deutsch, Nguyen v. Ins and the Application of Intermediate Scrutiny to 
Gender Classifications: Theory, Practice, and Reality, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 185 (2003). 
10
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protection, and strict scrutiny is the standard that provides the unwed 
father with this utmost protection.89 
III.  UNWED BIOLOGICAL FATHERS AND THEIR RIGHT TO 
PARENT: THE SUPREME COURT’S POSITION 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that a biological 
parent’s relationship with his or her child is a fundamental right that is 
tied to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.90  The state should 
only sever such a connection under limited circumstances.91  Different 
Supreme Court Justices, however, have differing opinions on this 
issue.92   
According to Justice Stewart, one of these limited 
circumstances occurs in his dissent in Caban v. Mohammed.93  Justice 
Stewart suggested that a biological father’s parental rights are second-
rate compared to those of a biological mother:  
Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the 
biological connection between parent and child.  They 
require relationships more enduring . . . . The mother 
carries and bears the child, and in this sense her parental 
relationship is clear.  The validity of the father’s 
parental claims must be gauged by other measures. 94   
In Justice Stewart’s view, the biological relationship between a 
natural unwed father and his biological child presents the unwed father 
with a chance to “accept . . . some measure of responsibility for the 
child’s future” so that he can “enjoy the blessings of the parent-child 
relationship.”95   
If an unwed biological father does not grasp that chance, then 
Justice Stewart suggested, that person should not have a 
constitutionally protected right.96  Once an unwed father grasps the 
parent-child relationship, however, the Court has recognized that “a 
 
89 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 755, 753 (1982) (discussing “the fundamental liberty 
interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”). 
90 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
91 Id. 
92 See discussion infra Part III. 
93 Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979). (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
94 Id. 
95 Lehr, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). 
96 Id. 
11
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father, no less than a mother, has a constitutionally protected right to 
the companionship, care, custody, and management of the children he 
has sired and raised.”97  
After more than three decades, Justice Scalia took an 
alternative view in his dissenting opinion in Adoptive Couple v. Baby 
Girl.98  In this case, a baby girl was born to a Hispanic mother and 
Cherokee Indian father.99  The parents were not married at the time the 
child was born, which occurred off the Cherokee reservation.100  
During pregnancy, the father voluntarily surrendered his parental 
rights to the mother via text message.101  When the baby was born, the 
mother placed the child up for adoption.102  The adoptive parents 
notified the father of the pending adoption, who in turn did not consent 
to the adoption, but sought custody of the child.103   
The Court determined that the Indian Child Welfare Act104 does 
not protect the rights of a parent who has never had custody of a 
child.105  Justice Scalia opined that the Court’s decision “needlessly 
demean[ed] the rights of parenthood.”106  Justice Scalia continued:  
It has been the constant practice of the common law to 
respect the entitlement of those who bring a child into 
the world to raise that child.  We do not inquire whether 
leaving a child with his parents is “in the best interests 
of the child.”  It sometimes is not, he would be better 
off raised by someone else.  But parents have their 
rights, no less than children do.  This father wants to 
raise his daughter and the statute amply protects his 
right to do so.  There is no reason in law or policy to 
dilute that protection.107 
 
97 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 652 (1975). 
98 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
99 Id. at 2558. 
100 Id. at 2570. 
101 Id. at 2558. 
102 Id. 
103 Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2559. 
104 25 U.S.C.S. § 1901 (LexisNexis). 
105 Id. at 2571-87. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
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Evidently, Justice Scalia and Justice Stewart have vastly 
different views.108  The line of seminal Supreme Court cases, 
commonly referred to as the Stanley-Michael H. line, concerning the 
rights of unwed biological fathers tend to align closer to the sentiments 
of Justice Stewart’s dissent in Caban as opposed to Justice Scalia’s 
dissent in Baby Girl.109  In these cases, there is a preconceived notion 
that an unwed biological father is not a parent per se, but that he has 
the opportunity to become one.110  This preconceived notion stems 
from the belief that, in many instances, an unwed biological father does 
not intend to be a parent.111  However, it is unfair to assume that an 
unwed father cannot have the same or a similar relationship or 
connection with his child as that of an unwed mother’s relationship 
with her child merely because the unwed father did not physically give 
birth to the child.112  The following cases113 are instances in which an 
unwed father’s rights were deprived mostly for arbitrary reasons, 
depending on the facts of each case. 
A.  Stanley v. Illinois 
Historically, an unwed father’s rights to the enjoyment of the 
care and custody of his natural child were unclear.114  Prior to 1972,115 
the father of a child born out of wedlock was given few rights regarding 
his child, if any.116  However, for the first time in Stanley v. Illinois, 
the Court held that unwed fathers have certain due process and equal 
protection rights regarding child custody.117   
Joan Stanley and Peter Stanley, an unmarried couple, had three 
children out of wedlock.118  When Joan died, Mr. Stanley took full 
 
108 See discussion infra Part III. 
109 133 S. Ct. at 2571-87. (Scalia, J., dissenting); Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting).  
110 See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262. 
111 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650, 665-66; Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263. 
112 See discussion supra Part I. 
113 This Note will discuss Due Process claims, if any, as well as Equal Protection Claims.  
The Due Process Claims, however, are beyond the scope of this Note. 
114 See discussion supra Part I. 
115 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646. 
116 Karen C. Wehner, Daddy Wants Rights Too: A Perspective on Adoption Statutes, 31 
HOUS. L REV. 691, 702 (1994). 
117 Id. 
118 Although they were not married, they were so close that they shared the same surname. 
Id. at 646. 
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custody of his children.119  Under Illinois state law,120 the state did not 
need to show that Mr. Stanley was an unfit parent before taking away 
his custody rights121 because the law presumed that unwed fathers were 
unfit parents while married fathers, married mothers, and unwed 
mothers were fit.122  The State of Illinois then removed the children 
from Mr. Stanley’s custody, without a hearing to determine his 
parental fitness, and declared the children to be wards of the state in 
accordance with Illinois law and procedure.123  
Under this statutory scheme, Mr. Stanley, as an unwed father, 
had no right to an individualized hearing to determine his parental 
fitness.124  Mr. Stanley argued that the statute violated the Due Process 
Clause because he was automatically stripped of his right to a hearing 
without an opportunity to show his fitness to parent his biological 
children.125  Additionally, he argued that the statutory scheme violated 
the Equal Protection Clause because “he had never been shown to be 
an unfit parent and that since married fathers and unwed mothers could 
not be deprived of their children without such a showing, he had been 
deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed him by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”126  On the other hand, the State of Illinois 
argued that, based on “history and culture,” unwed fathers were 
“factually different” from married fathers because they were 
historically physically absent from the home, lacked interest in their 
children, and failed to accept responsibility for them.127   
The Court agreed with Mr. Stanley’s arguments, holding that 
the statute violated both the Due Process Clause and the Equal 
Protection Clause.128  Specifically, the Court held that Mr. Stanley had 
a due process right to present and defend his parental fitness in a court 
of law.129 Additionally, the Court held that the statute violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because denying unwed fathers the right to a 
parental fitness hearing while granting this hearing to other Illinois 
 
119 Id. 
120 ILL. REV. STAT., c. 37, § 705-8. 
121 Id. 
122 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 647. 
123 Id. at 646. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 649. 
126 Id. at 646.  
127 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 653. 
128 Id. at 658. 
129 Id. at 657-58. 
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parents was inescapably unequal. 130  It noted that while it may be true 
that many unwed fathers, historically, did not have a presence in their 
children’s lives, this was not the case for all unwed fathers both 
historically and today.131 Therefore, Mr. Stanley’s due process rights 
and equal protection rights were violated.132 
Justice Burger wrote a dissent, accepting the state’s overly 
general characterization of unwed fathers.133  In his view, Illinois had 
every right to protect “illegitimate” children by acknowledging a 
difference between unwed mothers and unwed fathers.134  He classified 
unwed fathers as “not traditionally quite so easy to identify and 
locate,”135 basing this “theory” on “centuries of human experience.”136  
Justice Burger opined that in the absence of marriage, adoption, or 
some other legal undertaking, an unwed father might be denied the 
same privileges that a married father enjoys.137  In Justice Burger’s 
view, Equal Protection is not violated when the state only gives 
benefits to married fathers and not unmarried fathers because marriage 
creates legal obligations not only to the marriage itself but also legal 
obligations in adoption proceedings.138 
Overall, while the dissent implied that men were per se 
reluctant fathers if they were not married or did not adopt their 
children, the majority looked at the issue in a more objective light.139  
The majority reasoned that Mr. Stanley, who had “sired and raised” his 
children, despite not being married, must be held to the same standard 
as any other parent would be.140  The majority in Stanley rejected the 
stigma of unwed fathers as uninterested and uninvolved in the lives of 
their children.141   
 
130 Id. at 650. 
131 Id. at 654-55, 
132 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645. 
133 Id. at 659-68. (Burger, J., dissenting). 
134 Id. at 665.  
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 666.  
137 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 664.  Additionally, Justice Burger argued that the Court should not 
have looked at Due Process at all because Mr. Stanley did not raise it in the lower courts.  Id. 
at 662. 
138 Justice Burger opined that Equal Protection was not violated “when the state gives full 
recognition only to those father-child relationships that arise in the context of family units 
bound together by legal obligations arising from marriage or from adoption proceedings.” Id. 
139 See generally Id. 
140 Id. at 650. 
141 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649. 
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The Stanley Court applied a variation of intermediate 
scrutiny.142  In the opinion, Justice White stated “[t]he private interest 
here, that of a man in the children he sired and raised, undeniably 
warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, 
protection.”143  The burden placed on the State by the Stanley Court 
was not only greater than a mere rational basis test of minimal scrutiny 
but also less demanding than a heightened scrutiny standard, which 
required a showing of necessity.144  The Supreme Court, however, does 
not always react this way when presented with an unwed father case.145  
Six years following the decision in Stanley, the Court took a step 
backward in giving rights to unwed fathers. 
B. Quilloin v. Walcott 
In Quilloin v. Walcott,146 the father, Mr. Quilloin, never 
actually married the mother of his child nor did he and the mother ever 
share an established home as a family.147  When Mr. Quilloin’s child 
was less than three years old, the mother married another man,148 and 
this man moved to adopt the child years later.149  Mr. Quilloin 
“provided support only on an irregular basis,” but did visit his child on 
“many occasions.”150  Under a Georgia statute,151 unwed fathers do not 
have the right to veto an adoption unless they had already legitimized 
their children.152  Despite this, however, Mr. Quilloin attempted to 
block the adoption via a petition for legitimation.153  
The trial court found that approving the stepfather’s adoption 
and denying the biological father’s petition for legitimation were in the 
best interests of the child.154  As such, it rejected Mr. Quilloin’s petition 
 
142 Linda R. Crane, Family Values and the Supreme Court, 25 CONN. L. REV. 427, 453, 
n.171 (1993). 
143 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.  
144 Crane, supra note 142. 
145 See generally Crane, supra note 142. 
146 Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
147 Id. at 247. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 249. 
150 Id. at 251. 
151 See GA. CODE ANN. § 74–403(3) and § 74–203. 
152 Id. 
153 Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 248-49. 
154 Id. at 250-51. 
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to block the adoption for lack of standing.155  Mr. Quilloin argued he 
could not be shut out by the court in this way without a showing (a la 
Stanley) that he was an unfit parent.156  After the Supreme Court of 
Georgia affirmed the trial court’s decision, he appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court and was granted a writ of certiorari.157  The U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a Georgia statute denying an unwed father the 
right to veto an adoption of his illegitimate child by another man did 
not violate the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause.158   
The Court unanimously denied Mr. Quilloin’s petition for 
legitimation under the “best interests of the child” standard and 
affirmed the stepfather’s adoption of Mr. Quilloin’s biological son.159  
The Court first opined that, although the Stanley Court found a 
“father’s interest in the companionship, care, custody, and 
management” of his children to be “cognizable and substantial,”160 the 
Stanley Court still “left unresolved” the rights of unwed fathers in cases 
where “the countervailing interests are more substantial.”161  The Court 
pointed out that Mr. Quilloin provided support only on an irregular 
basis,162 and the mother believed that Mr. Quilloin’s visits and gifts 
had a “disruptive effect on the child” and the family as a whole.163  
However, while the child wanted his stepfather to adopt him, she also 
desired to keep in contact with Mr. Quilloin as her biological father.164 
The Court acknowledged that the “Due Process Clause would 
be offended if a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural 
family . . . without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason 
that to do so was thought to be in the children’s best interest.”165  
However, this case was different.166  The Court listed three 
distinctions.167  First, Mr. Quilloin never “had, or sought actual or legal 
 
155 Id. at 251. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 253. 
158 Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256. 
159 Id. at 253. 
160 Id. at 248. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 251. 
163 Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 251. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 255 (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862–863 
(1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
166 Id. at 255. 
167 Id. 
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custody of his daughter.”168  Second, this was not a case “in which the 
proposed adoption would place the child with a new set of parents with 
whom the child had never before lived.”169  Lastly, the adoption will 
“give full recognition to a family unit already in existence, a result 
desired by all concerned, except [Mr. Quilloin].”170  With these 
distinctions in mind, the Court determined that the stepfather’s 
adoption of Mr. Quilloin’s biological child was in the child’s best 
interests.171 
Mr. Quilloin’s Equal Protection Clause arguments as to the 
unequal treatment of married fathers and unmarried fathers similarly 
failed.172  Mr. Quilloin argued that the state impermissibly treated his 
case differently because “his interests [were] indistinguishable from 
those of a married father who is separated or divorced from the mother 
and is no longer living with his child.”173  The Court rejected Mr. 
Quilloin’s arguments and emphasized that Mr. Quilloin never sought 
any responsibility, not even legal custody, before the stepfather’s 
adoption proceeding.174 The Court’s reasoning was ultimately based 
on the fact that Mr. Quilloin was a reluctant father.175  Thus, because 
Mr. Quilloin “never shouldered any significant responsibility with 
respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the 
child,” it was in the best interests of the child to live in an already 
existing family unit.176   
Overall, the Court refused to allow Mr. Quilloin to legitimize 
his child because it found that such a process was not “in the best 
interest of the child.”177 The Due Process claim failed because Mr. 
Quilloin did not have a previously established relationship with his 
child and the child’s best interests superseded any unrealized interest 
the father might have had.178  With respect to the Equal Protection 
claim, the Court found that, as opposed to Stanley where the father was 
active in his child’s life, Mr. Quilloin had forfeited his constitutional 
 
168 Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 256. 
173 Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 254. 
178 Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255. 
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protection of his parental status with his child by failing to accept any 
significant parenting responsibility for his child.179  The Quilloin Court 
applied intermediate scrutiny, noting that the State needed only to 
show that its actions were in the child’s best interest––this required 
more than the minimal scrutiny standard of showing a rational basis 
for the state action, but lacked the strict scrutiny requirement of 
showing necessity.180  Despite this brief step backward for unwed 
fathers, the Court would reaffirm a different unwed father’s rights one 
year later. 
C. Caban v. Mohammed 
Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed lived in New York City 
between 1968 and 1973.181  They commonly presented themselves as 
husband and wife, although they were never legally married because 
of Mr. Caban’s marriage with another woman.182  Despite this, Mr. 
Caban successfully functioned as a father to his two biological children 
with Maria.183  He lived with his children and their mother as a 
functioning family unit while providing them with necessary 
support,184 and his name even appeared on both of his children’s birth 
certificates.185  In December of 1973, Maria took the two children, and 
left Mr. Caban, to live with Kazim Mohammed, whom she married 
approximately one year later.186  Following Maria’s remarriage, Mr. 
Caban continued to see his two children at their maternal 
grandmother’s house on a weekly basis.187   
The grandmother returned to her home in Puerto Rico in 1974, 
and she took the children with her until Maria and Kazim Mohammed 
( “Mohammeds”) could start a business together in New York City, 
after which they would retrieve the children.188  At the conclusion of a 
trip to Puerto Rico in 1975, to visit his children, Mr. Caban took the 
 
179 Id. 256. 
180 Crane, supra note 142. 
181 Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979). 
182 Mr. Caban and his actual wife were separated. Id. 
183 Id. at 382. 
184 Id. 
185 Id.  
186 Id. 
187 Caban, 441 U.S. at 382. 
188 Id. 
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children with him back to New York City.189  Maria was unable to 
retain possession of her children through the police; she shortly, 
thereafter, filed for custody proceedings in New York Family Court.190  
The Mohammeds were awarded temporary custody and Mr. Caban 
was allowed visitation rights in the initial hearings.191  
At trial, Mr. Caban argued that biological fathers have a due 
process right to maintain a parental relationship with their children 
absent a finding of unfitness.192  He also argued that the New York 
statute193 at issue violated the Equal Protection Clause due to 
 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Caban, 441 U.S. at 385. 
193 The statute allowed for a mother to consent to an adoption “whether adult or infant, of a 
child born out of wedlock” and a father to consent to an adoption:  
[W]hether adult or infant, of a child born out-of-wedlock and placed with 
the adoptive parents more than six months after birth, but only if such 
father shall have maintained substantial and continuous or repeated 
contact with the child as manifested by: (i) the payment by the father 
toward the support of the child of a fair and reasonable sum, according to 
the father’s means, and either (ii) the father’s visiting the child at least 
monthly when physically and financially able to do so and not prevented 
from doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody 
of the child, or (iii) the father’s regular communication with the child or 
with the person or agency having the care or custody of the child, when 
physically and financially unable to visit the child or prevented from doing 
so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child. 
The subjective intent of the father, whether expressed or otherwise, 
unsupported by evidence of acts specified in this paragraph manifesting 
such intent, shall not preclude a determination that the father failed to 
maintain substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child. In 
making such a determination, the court shall not require a showing of 
diligent efforts by any person or agency to encourage the father to perform 
the acts specified in this paragraph. A father, whether adult or infant, of a 
child born out-of-wedlock, who openly lived with the child for a period of 
six months within the one year period immediately preceding the 
placement of the child for adoption and who during such period openly 
held himself out to be the father of such child shall be deemed to have 
maintained substantial and continuous contact with the child for the 
purpose of this subdivision. 
(e) Of the father, whether adult or infant, of a child born out-of-wedlock 
who is under the age of six months at the time he is placed for adoption, 
but only if: (i) such father openly lived with the child or the child’s mother 
for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the 
placement of the child for adoption; and (ii) such father openly held 
himself out to be the father of such child during such period; and (iii) such 
father paid a fair and reasonable sum, in accordance with his means, for 
the medical, hospital and nursing expenses incurred in connection with the 
20
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“overbroad generalizations” of gender-based classifications.194  
Seeking adoption of the children, the Mohammeds, on the other hand, 
argued that the gender-based distinctions were justified because there 
is a fundamental difference between a child’s relationship with his 
mother versus that of his father.195  The Mohammeds explained that “a 
natural mother, absent special circumstances, bears a closer 
relationship with her child . . . than a father does,” and therefore, an 
unwed biological father can never be as close to their child as an unwed 
mother can.196  The Surrogate’s Court granted Mr. Mohammed’s 
petition for adoption, thereby cutting off all of Mr. Caban’s “parental 
rights and obligations” to his children.197  
Both the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division, Second 
Department, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the 
Surrogate’s Court’s decision.198  Mr. Caban then appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court and was granted a writ of certiorari.199  The U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a New York statute allowing a stepfather to 
adopt his wife’s non-marital child without the consent of the child’s 
biological father was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause due to 
overbroad generalizations of gender-based classifications.200 
In a controversial five to four decision,  U.S. Supreme Court 
found that, while there was no Due Process Clause violation,201 there 
was an Equal Protection Clause violation based on gender 
discrimination because unwed mothers and unwed fathers, who 
maintain relationships with their children, are similarly situated, and 
therefore, cannot be treated differently.202  The Court held that the law 
failed the intermediate scrutiny test because there was no showing 
“that the different treatment afforded [to] unmarried fathers and 
unmarried mothers b[ore] a substantial relationship” to the state’s 
asserted interest in promoting the adoption of illegitimate children.203  
 
mother’s pregnancy or with the birth of the child.” N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 
§ 111 (McKinney 1977). 
194 Caban, 441 U.S. at 394. 
195 Id. at 387. 
196 Id. at 388. 
197 Id. at 383-84. 
198 Id. at 384-85. 
199 Caban, 441 U.S. at 385. 
200 Id. at 394. 
201 The Court dismissed his due process argument because Mr. Caban “was given due notice 
and was permitted to participate as a party in the adoption proceedings” Id. at n. 3. 
202 Caban, 441 U.S. at 392. 
203 Id. at 393. 
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The Court rejected the argument that unwed fathers could 
never be as close to their children as unwed mothers because “even if 
unwed mothers as a class were closer than unwed fathers to their 
newborn infants, this generalization concerning parent-child relations 
would become less acceptable as a basis for legislative distinctions as 
the age of the child increased.”204  Several facts were important to the 
Court’s decision: (i) the children were older, (ii) there was no difficulty 
in identifying or locating the father, and (iii) the father had established 
a “substantial relationship” with his children and even “admitted his 
paternity.”205  Thus, the New York statute violated the Equal 
Protection Clause because it denied unwed fathers of their right to 
block an adoption of their children, but granted this right to unwed 
mothers.206 
Justice Stewart and Justice Stevens both dissented, asserting 
that women and men were sufficiently different to warrant different 
treatment under the laws of New York.207  The Justices’ concerns 
focused on the potential impact that adoption could have on very young 
or newborn children.208  Specifically, Justice Stevens pointed out that 
“[o]nly the mother carries the child; it is she who has the constitutional 
right to decide whether to bear it or not . . . “209 and only she “knows 
who sired the child, and it will often be within her power to withhold 
that fact, and even the fact of her pregnancy from that person.”210  
Because the mother is obviously linked with the child throughout 
pregnancy and birth, Justice Stevens reasoned that her identity to the 
child is clear and obvious, whereas the identity of the natural father 
may not be known for quite some time, if ever.211  Because of these 
differences, he argued that unmarried mothers have to make adoption 
decisions on their own, whereas unmarried fathers may have to marry 
the mothers in order to gain such rights.212   
Overall, Caban represented another case in which the Court 
recognized the parental rights of unwed fathers who have established 
 
204  Id. at 389. 
205 Id. at 392-93. 
206 Id. at 393-94. 
207 Caban, 441 U.S. at 394, 404.  
208 Id. at 404. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 405. 
211 Id. at 405. 
212 Caban, 441 U.S. at 407-08. 
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relationships with their children.213  The Court struck down the New 
York statute using an intermediate standard of scrutiny because it 
treated similarly situated unwed mothers and fathers differently solely 
based on gender classifications while serving no important 
governmental interest.214  Unfortunately, the rights of unwed fathers 
would suffer a setback via the Court’s affirmance of a different New 
York statute four years later. 
D. Lehr v. Robertson 
In Lehr v. Robertson,215 Lorraine Robertson was not married 
when she gave birth to her daughter in November 1976.216  The father 
of the child, Jonathan Lehr, lived with Lorraine prior to the birth and 
even visited her in the hospital, but his name did not appear on the 
child’s birth certificate.217  Post-birth, he did not live with Lorraine and 
the child, did not provide them with financial support, and did not offer 
to marry Lorraine.218  Mr. Lehr had also not been judicially determined 
to be the father, and he failed to enter his name into the state’s putative 
father registry.219  Within months of giving birth, Lorraine married 
another man, Mr. Robertson, who then sought to adopt Lorraine’s 
daughter in a proceeding in Ulster County.220  
One month after the adoption proceeding began in Ulster 
County, and still unaware of it, Mr. Lehr filed a visitation and paternity 
action in Westchester County Family Court asking for a 
“determination of paternity, an order of support, and reasonable 
visitation privileges with [his daughter].”221  When the Ulster County 
court was notified of this paternity proceeding in Westchester, it issued 
a stay on that proceeding to determine whether that proceeding should 
be transferred to Ulster County.222  About two weeks later, Mr. Lehr 
 
213 See generally Caban, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
214 Id. at 394. 
215 Lehr, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
216 Id. at 250. 
217 Id. at 250. 
218 Id. at 248.  Mr. Lehr did claim that he eventually offered financial aid to the mother and 
stepfather at some point. Id. at 269. 
219 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251.  A “putative father registry” is “[a]n official roster in which an 
unwed father may claim possible paternity of a child for purposes of receiving notice of a 
prospective adoption of the child.” Ex parte D.B., 975 So.2d 940, 958 (Ala. 2007). 
220 Id. at 250. 
221 Id. at 252. 
222 Id. at 252-53. 
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received notice of the change of venue motion, and, for the first time, 
learned that an adoption proceeding was pending in Ulster County.223  
In the meantime, the Ulster County judge entered an adoption order 
without notice to Mr. Lehr because he did not believe that such notice 
was required.224  As such, the proceeding in Westchester was not 
transferred to Ulster County and the judge in Westchester dismissed 
Mr. Lehr’s paternity action instead, holding that the putative father’s 
right to seek paternity “must be deemed severed so long as an order of 
adoption exists.”225   
Mr. Lehr then filed a petition in Ulster County Family Court to 
vacate the order because it was “obtained by fraud” and “violated his 
constitutional rights.”226  The Ulster County Family Court considered 
the question of whether it “dropped the ball” by approving the adoption 
without providing Mr. Lehr with proper notice.227  After much 
deliberation, the court denied the petition.228  The Appellate Division 
of the Supreme Court, Second Department, affirmed, holding that 
“appellant’s commencement of a paternity action did not give him 
any right to receive notice of the adoption proceeding, that the notice 
provisions of the statute were constitutional,” and that Caban would 
not apply here because the ruling from Caban, where a father’s consent 
for adoption was required, “was not retroactive”229  The court also 
noted that Mr. Lehr “could have insured his right to notice by signing 
the putative father registry.”230   
The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed, stating that the 
Ulster County Family Court “had not abused its discretion either when 
it entered the order without notice or when it denied appellant’s 
petition to reopen the proceedings.”231  It reasoned that, while it “might 
have been prudent” to provide notice, the lower court did not abuse its 
discretion because the primary purpose of the notice provision was “to 
enable the person served to provide the court with evidence concerning 
the best interest of the child, and that appellant had made no tender 
 
223 Id. at 253. 
224 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 253. 
225 Id. at 253. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 253. 
228 See generally, In the Matter of the Adoption by Lorraine and Richard Robertson of 
Jessica Martz, 423 N.Y.S.2d 378 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979). 
229 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 253-54. 
230 Id. at 254, (quoting Adoption of Martz, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 774). 
231 Id. at 255.  
24
Touro Law Review, Vol. 34 [2018], No. 2, Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss2/16
2018 UNEQUAL PROTECTION 673 
indicating any ability to provide any particular or special information 
relevant to [his daughter’s] best interest.”232  The U.S. Supreme Court 
then invoked appellate jurisdiction to hear the case,233 and the opinion 
was written by none other than Justice Stevens (the dissenter from 
Caban).234   
Mr. Lehr argued that the aforementioned events, along with the 
statute in question, deprived him of a liberty interest protected under 
the Due Process Clause.235  As such, he believed “he had a 
constitutional right to prior notice and an opportunity to be heard 
before he was deprived of that interest.236“  Mr. Lehr also argued “that 
the gender-based classification in the statute, which . . . denied him the 
right to consent to [his daughter’s] adoption and accorded him fewer 
procedural rights than her mother, violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.”237  Mr. Lehr, thus, sought to vacate the adoption.238 
As for Mr. Lehr’s due process argument, the Court first 
carefully examined the nature of the liberty interest that was at stake—
the right of parents “to control the education of their children” and the 
“right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their 
children] for additional obligations.”239  However, the Court noted that, 
while parents generally may have this protected liberty interest, this 
protection extended to unwed fathers only when they had assumed 
responsibility for their children.240   
The Court, citing to Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban, reached the 
following conclusion:  
When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment 
to the responsibilities of parenthood by “com[ing] 
forward to participate in the rearing of his child,” his 
interest in personal contact with his child acquires 
substantial protection under the due process clause.  At 
that point it may be said that he “act[s] as a father 
toward his children.”  But the mere existence of a 
 
232 Id. 
233 Id. at 254. 
234 Lehr, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
235 Id. at 255. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 535. 
240 See generally Lehr, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
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biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional 
protection.  The actions of judges neither create nor 
sever genetic bonds.241 
The Court reasoned that a biological connection itself is not 
enough to create a protected interest because it provides a natural father 
only with an opportunity to maintain and develop a relationship with 
his child.242  Only if the unwed biological father seizes this opportunity 
and take some responsibility for the well-being and future of the child 
would he be able to have his parental rights protected by the 
Constitution.243 
Because Mr. Lehr did not take advantage of the opportunity 
provided for him via the statute,244 the Court did not recognize any sort 
of protected special relationship.245  The Court found the state’s 
putative registry system246 to be non-arbitrary because the “right to 
receive notice was completely within [Mr. Lehr’s] control,” and he 
ultimately chose not to enter his name there.247  Additionally, the Court 
used the “best interests of the child” standard in order to avoid breaking 
up what was already a functioning family unit, as it did in Caban.248  
Because it was Mr. Lehr’s fault for not entering his name in the state’s 
putative father registry and for not seeking to establish a legal 
connection to his child until after the child turned two years old, the 
Court struck down his due process argument.249  As such, the Court 
held that the Due Process Clause does not require that notice be given 
in all cases to a biological father on the pendency of an adoption 
proceeding concerning the child.250 
The Court then dismissed Mr. Lehr’s Equal Protection Clause 
argument, holding that Mr. Lehr was not similarly situated to the 
 
241 Id. at 261. (citations omitted). 
242 Id. 
243 Id. 
244 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a (2) (McKinney 1977).  The statute provides that if 
a father files with the states putative father registry, that act would demonstrate his intent to 
claim paternity of his child born out of wedlock, and therefore he would be entitled to receive 
notice of any proceeding to adopt his child. Id. 
245 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264. 
246 The system required Mr. Lehr to simply mail in a postcard if he wanted notice.  This in 
effect provides unwed fathers a simple means to show their interest in their children. Id. 248-
49, 263. 
247 Id. at 264. 
248 Id. at 262. 
249 Id. at 262-63. 
250 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 249. 
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mother because he was a reluctant father who, unlike the mother, did 
not try to take advantage of his opportunity to be a parent.251  Thus, the 
Court found that there was no gender discrimination at issue because 
the mother and father were not similarly situated; deciding instead that 
the distinction between married fathers and unmarried fathers was 
reasonable.252   
Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld New York’s law 
providing for the termination of an unwed father’s rights if he failed to 
place his name on the putative father registry.253  It rejected the 
plaintiff’s claims under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection 
Clause254 and expanded on the distinction between reluctant fathers 
and fathers who actually take advantage of their parental obligations 
and develop a nurturing relationship with their children.255  This case 
differs from the previous cases in that it draws a line, albeit one 
susceptible to debate, between unwed biological fathers who may have 
rights and those who may not.256 
The dissent in Lehr, penned by Justice White and joined by 
Justices Marshall and Blackmun, took issue with the majority’s easy 
dismissal of Mr. Lehr’s right to notice and the opportunity to be 
heard.257  In particular, the dissent asserted that Mr. Lehr did not have 
an opportunity to present his case fully,258 and fair judgment could not 
be made “based on the quality or substance of a relationship without a 
complete and developed factual record.”259  The dissent also noted, 
which the opinion did not discuss, that Mr. Lehr was not a reluctant 
parent at all because he visited the mother every day in the hospital 
after the birth of his child,260 and he searched for the child in vain when 
the mother hid from him after her release from the hospital.261  In his 
search, Mr. Lehr even hired a detective agency, only to learn that 
Lorraine had already married a Mr. Robertson.262  Additionally, 
 
251 Id. at 267-68. 
252 Id. at 268 n.27.  
253 Id. at 264. 
254 Id. at 250. 
255 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261-62. 
256 See generally Lehr, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
257 Id. at 268. (White, J., dissenting). 
258 Id. 
259 Id. at 270-71. 
260 See generally Lehr, 463 U.S. at 268-77. (White, J., dissenting). 
261 Id. at 269. 
262 Id. 
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according to Mr. Lehr, Lorraine refused his many offers of financial 
assistance for the child and forced him to stay away from her and the 
child.263  It was at this point that Mr. Lehr decided to take legal 
action.264  The dissent suggested that the Robertson’s commenced the 
stepfather adoption proceeding “perhaps as a response” to these 
actions by Mr. Lehr.265   
The dissent gave the “biological relationship” more weight 
than the majority.266  Justice White rejected “the peculiar notion that 
the only significance of the biological connection between father and 
child is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male 
possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring.”267  Justice 
White further stated that a “mere biological relationship is not as 
unimportant in determining the nature of liberty interests as the 
majority suggests.”268  He opined that, where there was no doubt about 
the identity or location of a putative father, it is difficult to accept such 
careless treatment of procedural protections and insistence on “the 
sheerest formalism to deny him a hearing because he informed the 
State in the wrong manner.269“  Thus, in addition to portraying how 
simple it is to distort the facts and paint a different picture of Mr. Lehr’s 
behavior, the dissent primarily focused on the majority’s diminishing 
of procedural due process.270 
In deciding the due process issue, the Court applied only a 
minimal level of scrutiny after it decided that the facts failed to show 
Mr. Lehr had rights which were significant enough to require an 
application of a higher level of scrutiny.271  The Court did not apply a 
standard of scrutiny to the equal protection claim because it determined 
that Mr. Lehr was not similarly situated to the mother of his child.272  
The Court noted that “[i]f one parent has an established custodial 
relationship with the child and the other parent has either abandoned 
or never established a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does 
 
263 Id. 
264 Id. 269. (White, J., dissenting). 
265 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269. 
266 See generally id. at 268-77. (White, J., dissenting). 
267 Id. at 271. 
268 Id. 
269 Clearly, the dissent took issue with this “grudging and crabbed approach to due process.” 
Id. at 274-75. 
270 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 276. 
271 Crane, supra note 142. 
272 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267-68. 
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not prevent a state from according the two parents different legal 
rights.”273 
In sum, the Court in Lehr diminished the rights of unwed 
fathers when it upheld the New York law providing for the termination 
of an unwed father’s rights if he fails to place his name on the putative 
father registry.274  This case illustrates this Note’s argument that unwed 
fathers, in a similar position as Mr. Lehr, should be able to reap the 
benefits of a strict scrutiny analysis as opposed to the minimal level 
applied in this case.275  Although this case affirmed the rights of fathers 
who did put their names on the putative father registry, such an act 
would not be enough for that same unwed father to have his rights 
affirmed in the following case. 
E.  Michael H. v. Gerald D. 
In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,276 a woman named Carole had an 
extramarital affair with her neighbor, Michael, and became pregnant 
with his child.277  Carole still lived with her husband, Gerald, during 
this time.278  Post-birth, Carole and the child briefly resided with 
Michael,279 but then Carole returned with the child to live with Gerald 
and attempted to sever the relationship between Michael and the 
child.280  Blood tests confirmed there was a 98.07% chance that 
Michael was the biological father of the child.281  Carole claimed the 
child was a product of her marriage to Gerald, and she withdrew her 
stipulation to the results of Michael’s blood tests, which showed with 
high probability that he was the child’s biological father.282  Under 
California law,283 only a mother or her husband could deny paternity 
of a child born into a marriage.284  Absent Carole’s consent, Michael 
lacked standing to establish paternity over his biological child or even 
 
273 Id. 
274 Id. at 264. 
275 See discussion supra Part I. 
276 Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
277 Id. at 114. 
278 Id. at 113-14. 
279 Id. 
280 Id. at 115. 
281 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114. 
282 Id. at 114-15. 
283 CAL. EVID. CODE § 621. 
284 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 117. 
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to seek visitation.285  Although the child referred to Michael as her 
“daddy,”286 the child resided with Carole and Gerald.287  Gerald held 
the child out to be his own.288  When the court prevented Michael from 
establishing any legal relationship with his biological child,289 it 
automatically elevated Gerald’s status from stepfather to actual legal 
father without going through an adoption proceeding.290 
Michael argued that his due process rights were violated 
because the California law denied him his rights as a putative father to 
legally establish a relationship with his biological child since the 
mother of his child was married to a different man.291  He did not argue 
an Equal Protection violation.292  The California trial court and the 
California Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the 
California law.293  While the California Supreme Court denied 
discretionary review of the case, the U.S. Supreme Court asserted 
“probable jurisdiction” to hear the case.294  In a plurality opinion, the 
Court held that a biological father does not have a fundamental right 
to obtain legal parental rights over his child after the presumptive 
father has already exercised significant responsibility over the child.295    
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Michael argued both his 
procedural due process rights296 and substantive due process rights 
were violated.297  Specifically, he argued his procedural due process 
rights were violated because he was not afforded the “opportunity to 
demonstrate his paternity in an evidentiary hearing” before the state 
terminated his liberty interest with his child.298  However, the Court 
upheld the California law, reasoning that although the law was facially 
procedural, it was, in reality, a substantive rule because it helped to 
further the state’s interest in preserving the integrity of the family 
 
285 Id. at 126. 
286 Id. at 144. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
287 Id. at 110. 
288 Id. at 110. 
289 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 116. 
290 Id. at 116. 
291 Id. at 111. 
292 Id. at 116-17. 
293 Id. at 116. 
294 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 116. 
295 Id. at 125. 
296 Id. at 124. 
297 Id. at 121. 
298 Id. at 119. 
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unit.299  Thus, Michael’s procedural due process claim failed because 
the statute was not in fact procedural in purpose.300 
The Court also denied Michael’s substantive due process claim 
because Michael did not have a protected liberty interest as an unwed 
biological father of a child born into a pre-existing marital 
relationship.301  Specifically, it reasoned that, where “the child is born 
into an extant marital family, the natural father’s unique opportunity 
conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity of the husband of the 
marriage; and it is not unconstitutional for the State to give categorical 
preference to the latter.”302   
The Court noted that in order for Michael to be successful, it 
was his burden to prove society traditionally allows a father to assert 
parental rights over his child born into an existing marital family; the 
Court could not find anything “in the older sources, nor in the older 
cases.”303  Michael argued his case was similar to those of Stanley, 
Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr in that these established a liberty interest 
created by biological fatherhood plus an established parental 
relationship––factors that he argued existed in his case.304  The Court, 
however, thought Michael’s interpretations “distorts the rationale of 
those cases.”305  The Court felt those cases “rest not upon such isolated 
factors but upon the historic respect—indeed, sanctity would not be 
too strong a term—traditionally accorded to the relationships that 
develop within the unitary family.”306  Therefore, since the Court could 
not find any relevant sources to back up Michael’s claim, it ruled that 
Michael did not have a substantive due process right.307 
For the above reasons, it did not matter that Michael had 
established a parental relationship with his biological child during the 
first three years of her life by living with her, visiting her when 
possible, caring for her, and holding her out as his own.308   Although 
Michael had demonstrated “a full commitment to the responsibilities 
of parenthood by ‘com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his 
 
299 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 119. 
300 Id. 
301 Id. at 111. 
302 Id. at 129. 
303 Id. at 125. 
304 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123. 
305 Id. at 123. 
306 Id. 
307 Id. at 127. 
308 Id. at 143-44. (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
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child,’” he did not have a liberty interest because his child was born 
into an existing family unit, and it was in the child’s best interests to 
preserve the integrity of that family unit.309  In other words, the Court 
held that the only way a legal relationship between Michael and his 
biological child could be recognized would be if there were not already 
a functioning legal family unit.310   Interestingly, the Court did not 
apply any standard of constitutional scrutiny in this case; instead, the 
Court “embellish[ed] elaborately” on the importance of protecting the 
“traditional presumptions of paternity.”311 
In a lengthy and fiery dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the 
Court’s reliance on a basic definition of “tradition” was 
“misguided.”312  Justice Brennan wrote: 
[T]he plurality ignores the kind of society in which our 
Constitution exists.  We are not an assimilative, 
homogeneous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic one, 
in which we must be willing to abide someone else’s 
unfamiliar or even repellent practice because the same 
tolerant impulse protects our own 
idiosyncra[s]ies.   Even if we can agree, therefore, that 
“family” and “parenthood” are part of the good life, it 
is absurd to assume that we can agree on the content of 
those terms and destructive to pretend that we do.  In a 
community such as ours, “liberty” must include the 
freedom not to conform.  The plurality today squashes 
this freedom by requiring specific approval from 
history before protecting anything in the name of 
liberty.313 
It is evident Justice Brennan did not play into what appears as 
gender stereotyping that Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion does; Justice 
Brennan made it clear that unwed fathers are entitled to fundamental 
 
309 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 143 (citations omitted). 
310 Id. at 126-27. 
311 Crane, supra note 142. 
312 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140. 
313 Justice Brennan admonished the plurality for its decision to deny Michael his liberty 
interest in being a father.  Basing its decision on the fact that a similar situation has not 
happened before, the plurality, in Justice Brennan’s view, turns the Constitution into a 
“stagnant, archaic, hidebound document steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a time 
long past.” Id. at 141. 
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rights despite the circumstances.314  He referred to the plurality’s 
exclusive reliance on “tradition” as both “misguided” and “novel”315 
and felt that the plurality’s approach was “troubling” because of how 
“unnecessary” it was.316  With mention of Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, 
and Lehr, Justice Brennan rejected the notion that concern for the 
“unitary family” can alter the meaning of this line of cases.317 
Michael H. v. Gerald D. was clearly different from the previous 
four cases in that it based its decision on the sacredness and historical 
influence of the unitary family.318  Combined, this line of cases 
represents the Courts present take on the rights, or lack thereof, of 
unwed biological fathers.319  
IV. ANALYSIS 
The rights of unwed biological fathers is a topic that has been 
and likely to continue to be debated by Courts and scholars alike.320  It 
is evident that the general consensus on this topic changes based on 
which generation of Supreme Court Justices are sitting on the Court at 
the time a relevant case is presented to them.321  To see where the Court 
may be headed in the near future regarding this issue, an analysis of 
where it has been in the not so distant past is required.322 
A. The Stanley-Michael H. Line 
Commonly referred to as the “Stanley-Lehr line,”323 Stanley, 
Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr each examined the constitutional rights of 
unwed fathers.324  While each case mainly focused on resolving factual 
issues rather than developing a systematic theoretical scheme, each 
case builds on its predecessor; thus, this line of cases presents an 
 
314 Id.  Even if the child in question is already a part of a functioning familial atmosphere.  
Id. 
315 Id. at 140. 
316 Id. at 141. 
317 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 143-47. 
318 Id. at 123. 
319 See discussion infra Part IV. 
320 See discussion supra Part I. 
321 See discussion supra Part I. 
322 See discussion infra Part IV. 
323 See Mark Strassser, The Often Illusory Protections of “Biology Plus:” On the Supreme 
Court’s Parental Rights Jurisprudence, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 31 (2007). 
324 See cases cited supra note 1. 
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“integrated articulation of the parental rights of unwed fathers.”325  The 
cases stand for the notion that a father who participates in his child’s 
life enjoys the fundamental constitutional right to have a relationship 
with his child despite not being married to the child’s mother.326  
Caban v. Mohammed, in particular, strongly supported this notion by 
upholding the rights of Mr. Caban, an unwed father.327  Lehr v. 
Robertson and Quilloin, despite denying the rights of the unwed father 
because he did not contribute or partake in his respective children’s 
lives, still acknowledged that substantial rights of an unwed father do 
in fact exist if the father chooses to participate in his children’s lives.328  
Since the fathers in the Stanley-Lehr line of cases “did not meet any 
other criteria for establishing parenthood,” it can be said that the 
Court’s interpretation of the word “father” in these cases meant a 
“natural or biological father.”329   
Michael H. v. Gerald D., the most recent of the unwed father 
cases, changed the game and is an example of the Court’s confusion 
when it comes to unwed father cases because it had no majority 
opinion330 and the positions of each of the Justices was relatively 
unclear.331  Thus, to develop a constitutional rule that can be broadly 
applied to a future unwed father case may be “almost impossible.”332  
Despite a plurality opinion, Michael H. rejected the general rule from 
the Stanley-Lehr line of cases––that an unwed father can maintain his 
parental rights if he chooses to participate in his children’s lives; 
meaning, five Justices still, in fact, accepted the validity of this rule in 
Michael H.333   
While this Note agrees with the general rule of the Stanley-Lehr 
line of cases, this Note more specifically aligns itself with the 
outcomes of Stanley and Caban, where the individual father’s rights 
 
325 Anthony Miller, The Case for the Genetic Parent: Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, Lehr, and 
Michael H. Revisited, 53 LOY. L. REV. 395, 415-16 (2007). 
326 See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261; Caban, 441 U.S. at 392; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255; Stanley, 
405 U.S. 645, 657-58. 
327 Caban, 441 U.S. at 391-94. 
328 See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255; Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260-61. 
329 Miller, supra note 325, at 416. 
330 It was a plurality opinion. 
331 Miller, supra note 325, at 416-17. 
332 Id. at 417. 
333 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Here, Justice Brennan described 
the common ground that most of the Justices did share despite not agreeing on the overall 
outcome of the case. Id. 
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were affirmed, and against Lehr, Quilloin, and Michael H., where the 
individual father’s rights were denied.334   
In Stanley and Caban, the Court specifically upheld the rights 
of the unwed fathers because those fathers previously had custody of 
their respective child.335  While the Court in Michael H. later stated 
that even if a father once had custody, that still may not be a sufficient 
condition to protect the unwed father’s rights.336  The fathers in Stanley 
and Caban had established parental bonds with their respective 
children, while the fathers in Lehr and Quilloin did not have such a 
relationship––this may be why the Court chose to uphold the 
individual father’s rights in the former cases and not the latter.337   
In the Lehr and Quilloin cases, although the Court refused to 
enforce the rights of the unwed fathers because they did not participate 
in their children’s lives, the Court acknowledged potential substantial 
rights for an unwed participatory father under a different set of facts 
not before the Court.338  Thus, a concise rule from these four cases (and 
further explored in Lehr) may be stated as: “the genetic father who has 
participated in his child’s life has a constitutional right to have a 
relationship with his child.”339   
As previously referred to, Michael H. was an anomaly that 
wanted no part of this “rule” from the Stanley- Lehr line of cases.340  
One scholar noted that “it is uncertain whether Michael H. rejected this 
principle or overruled these cases.”341  Michael H. v. Gerald D. was a 
plurality opinion, so therefore, it is important to note that “[f]our 
Members of the Court agree that Michael H. has a liberty interest in 
 
334 See discussion supra Part III. 
335 See generally Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Caban, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
336 See generally Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
337 June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295 at note 142 
(2005).  As the Court explained in Lehr, the difference between the “developed parent-child 
relationship that was implicated in Stanley and Caban, and the potential relationship involved 
in Quilloin and [ Lehr]” is that in the former cases the unwed fathers came forward to 
participate in the rearing of their children. Lawrence Schlam, Third Part Disputes in 
Minnesota: Overcoming the “Natural Rights” of Parents Pursuing the “Best Interests” of 
Children?, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 733, 744, n.57 (2000). 
338 See, e.g., Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255.  The justices distinguished “a case in which the 
unwed father had, or sought, actual or legal custody of his child.” Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260-
61.  The Court stated that an unwed father acquires substantial protection when he participates 
in the rearing of his child. Id. 
339 Miller, supra note 325, at 416. 
340 See Michael H., 491 U.S. 110. 
341 Miller, supra note 325, at 453. 
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his relationship with [his biological child].”342  Justice Scalia’s 
opinion, being harsh towards the biological father, has indeed become 
the most renowned, but its “effect and meaning . . . are ambiguous to 
say the least.”343  Luckily, since Michael H. was a plurality opinion, its 
decision binds only the parties and it has no precedential effect.344  
Thus, this ongoing debate of constitutional protections of unwed 
fathers clearly remains unresolved.345   
The holdings of Stanley and Caban should be expanded to 
include non-participatory fathers, and Lehr and Quilloin should have 
enforced the non-participatory father’s rights by arguing that being a 
biological father alone, absent exceedingly persuasive facts that paint 
the father in a negative light, should entitle an unwed biological father 
to at least some constitutional right to affect the “care, custody, and 
management”346 of his child.347  Involvement in a child’s life should 
absolutely be encouraged and rewarded, but not being involved should 
not dispel an unwed father of all his constitutional rights as it pertains 
to his biological children, as it did in Michael H.348  
Clearly, the issue of who should qualify as a parent, be it unwed 
fathers or even unwed mothers, is currently in a state of flux.349  
Anthony Miller, a Professor at Pepperdine University School of Law 
writing for Loyola Law Review, argued that a logical conclusion from 
Michael H. is that each state is free to extend or deny constitutional 
rights of parents “almost at will.”350  He argued this because the only 
expressed definition of “parent” (genetic parents who have participated 
in their child’s) from the Stanley-Lehr line of cases was ignored by 
Michael H.’s plurality.351  Since Michael H., the Supreme Court has 
yet to definitively rule on what a constitutional “parent” entails and 
whether an unwed biological father may fit into that hypothetical 
definition.352 
 
342 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 136. (J. Brennan, dissenting). 
343 Miller, supra note 325, at 454-55. 
344 Id. at 455. 
345 See discussion supra Part IV. 
346 Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 253. 
347 See discussion supra Part IV. 
348 See Michael H., 491 U.S. 110. 
349 See generally Miller, supra note 325. 
350 Id. at 449. 
351 Id. 
352 Id. 
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V.  SOLUTION: RAISING THE STANDARD TO A HIGHER LEVEL OF 
SCRUTINY 
When examining a case dealing with the rights of an unwed 
father, the Court has historically applied an intermediate level of 
scrutiny to analyze the basis of the father’s claim.353  This is because 
the Court was analyzing the treatment of a specific statute as applied 
to unwed fathers as opposed to unwed mothers––a blatant gender 
discrimination and, by definition, subject to intermediate scrutiny.354  
However, the focus of analysis should not be on the mistreatment 
between genders, rather the Court’s focus should be based on the 
deprivation of a fundamental right, the right to parent; thus, subjecting 
the Court to apply strict scrutiny instead of intermediate scrutiny.   
The Supreme Court has held that the rights of individual 
parents are fundamental rights and are, thus, subject to strict 
scrutiny.355  Logically, this would mean that cases concerning the 
rights of unwed biological fathers are (or at least should be) subject to 
strict scrutiny.356  This, of course, assumes that the phrase “unwed 
biological father” fits into the Courts perspective of what a parent is.357  
Acknowledging the importance of this relationship, the Court has held 
the parent-child relationship to be such an important and sacred 
relationship that it should be afforded the utmost protection.358  The 
application of strict scrutiny would afford unwed fathers, as parents, 
the right to make decisions regarding the care of their children, giving 
them the fundamental constitutional protection they deserve.359 
VI. CONCLUSION  
The Supreme Court has yet to conclusively rule on what the 
definition of a constitutional parent entails and whether an unwed 
 
353 Caban, 491 U.S. at 391. 
354 Karen J. McMullen, The Scarlet “N:” Grandparent Visitation Statutes That Base 
Standing on Non-Intact Family Status Violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 693, 699 (2009). 
355 See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
356 See supra notes 357-59. 
357 See discussion infra Part VI. 
358 See Santosky, 455 U.S. 755, 753 (1982) (discussing “the fundamental liberty interest of 
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”). 
359 See generally id. 
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biological father may fit into that hypothetical definition.360  If and 
when this unique opportunity comes along, the Court should seize this 
moment by defining, constitutionally, the term parent and 
incorporating unwed fathers into that definition.361   
The definition of parent, including unwed fathers, should be 
“restored back to its pre-Michael H.” role.362  The Court in Michael H. 
denied rights to a biological father because he was not married to the 
mother at the time the child was born (despite being a part of the child’s 
life).363  This directly conflicts with the standard set forth from the 
Stanley-Lehr line of cases.364   
Additionally, the general rule stemming from the Stanley-Lehr 
line of cases, that substantial rights for an unwed father do in fact exist 
if the father chooses to participate in his children’s lives, should be 
expanded.365  As one author eloquently put it, a biological father should 
fit into this newfound definition of parent even if he did not receive an 
opportunity to develop a relationship with his biological child when: 
he has been “prevented through no fault of his or her own from 
establishing a relationship,” and  when he partakes in utilizing “cutting 
edge reproductive technology and the state has moved to sever the 
parent-child relationship before the opportunity to develop such a 
relationship has arisen.”366  If the government had the power to 
determine the definition of parent for constitutional purposes, as it did 
in Michael H., then it must also have the power to determine who can 
assert the fundamental constitutional rights that parents receive and the 
protections that go with it.367   
The constitutional right to parent should be associated with the 
individual as opposed to the individual’s marital status because the 
definition of a “normal” marriage or family is constantly evolving.368  
This Note argues that questions concerning the constitutional rights of 
not only unwed biological fathers but also parents in general, as it 
pertains to their children, should be subject to a strict scrutiny analysis. 
 
360 See discussion supra Part V. 
361 See Miller, supra note 325, at 349. 
362 See Miller, supra note 325, at 450. 
363 See Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
364 See discussion supra Part III. 
365 See discussion supra Part III. 
366 See discussion supra Part III.  
367 See discussion supra Part III. 
368 See discussion supra Part I. 
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In some unwed father cases, the U.S. Supreme Court stands up 
for and recognizes the rights of unwed biological fathers369 and, in 
other cases, denies basic liberty interests of unwed fathers370 possibly 
based on the Justices’ personal biases interfering with their judicial 
discretion.371  This Note agrees with the general rule from the Stanley-
Lehr line that substantial rights for an unwed father do in fact exist if 
the father chooses to participate in his children’s lives (and the 
holdings themselves in Stanley and Caban).372  Furthermore, this Note 
also believes that this rule should be expanded absent facts that paint 
the unwed father in a negative light; therefore, disagreeing with the 
specific holdings of Lehr and Quilloin.373  The Stanley and Caban 
Courts enforced the respective unwed father’s rights in part because 
the unwed fathers had established parental relationships with their 
children.374  The Court failed to enforce such rights in Quilloin or Lehr 
because of a lack of such relationship, though the Court did allude that 
different facts may have a different outcome.375 
This Note critically disagrees with the holding in Michael H. in 
which the Court held that a biological father does not have a 
fundamental right to obtain legal parental rights over his child after the 
presumptive father has already exercised significant responsibility 
over the child.376  If and when presented with the opportunity to define 
parent in a constitutional aspect, the Court must include unwed fathers 
and grant them constitutional rights to affect the “care, custody, and 
management”377 of their children even if only a limited variation 
thereof and even if the unwed father has historically been non-
participatory in his child’s life.378 
Gender stereotyping has been and unfortunately likely will 
continue to be a part of American society.379  When the Court denies 
an unwed father his parental rights with his biological child, the Court 
 
369 Caban, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
370 Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Lehr, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246 
(1978). 
371 See discussion supra Part I. 
372 See discussion supra Part IV. 
373 See discussion supra Part I. 
374 See Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Caban, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
375 See Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Lehr, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
376 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125. 
377 See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 253. 
378 Unless there are facts that paint the unwed father in a negative light. 
379 See discussion supra Part I. 
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does this based on what it believes a “normal” marriage or family to 
be.380  The Supreme Court has held that a biological parent’s 
relationship with his or her child is a fundamental right that is tied to 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and such a connection should 
only be severed by the state under limited circumstances.381 Therefore, 
this Note argues that attempts by the government to impinge these 
rights should be subject to a strict scrutiny type level of review rather 
than the current standard of intermediate scrutiny under Equal 
Protection.382   
Additionally, the Court should focus on the individual father’s 
rights having been violated rather than overemphasizing that 
individual’s marital status.383  Unwed fathers may not fit into the literal 
definition of what constitutes a parent, as established in Michael H., 
but there should be a place in a court-mandated expanded definition of 
the term parent to include all biological parents having protected, 
fundamental constitutional rights.384  Society should no longer allow 
Supreme Court Justices to legislate their interpretation of morality.385  
Unwed biological fathers should be protected by the fundamental right 
to parent, absent any negative facts to the contrary.386  This freedom 
should be protected by the highest level of scrutiny, protected even 
from any judicial biases.387 
 
 
380 See discussion supra Part IV. 
381 See Skinner, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
382 See discussion supra Part V. 
383 See discussion supra Part V. 
384 See discussion supra Part V. 
385 See discussion supra Part I. 
386 See discussion supra Part I. 
387 See discussion supra Part V. 
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